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Examples of adjudicators allowing appeals due to wrong details on ticket or the notice of rejection
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2130435061
Fresh Direct UK Ltd
Transport for London
11 Jun 2013 15:55:00
Finchley Rd / Boundary Rd
05 Dec 2013
Michael Nathan
Appeal allowed
This is a reserved decision following a personal appeal on 18 November 2013, attended by Mr A S Butler on behalf of the Appellant.
I have carefully considered the CCTV camera footage and still images from that footage provided by Transport for London (TfL), and am satisfied that this shows that the Appellant's vehicle, a van with registration mark WR62 LKV, had entered a box junction at Finchley Road/Boundary Road at 15:55 on 11 June 2013 at a time when its exit on the other side was not clear, and that it had remained stationary within the yellow markings for some eleven seconds. I observed that the Appellant's vehicle had followed the moving vehicles ahead of it, and that the car immediately in front had been prevented from leaving the box due to the traffic conditions ahead, and had itself stopped partly in the box, thus preventing further progress by the Appellant's van.
Paragraph 7(1) of Part II of Schedule 19 to the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 provides that, with certain exceptions (which have no application in this case), no person shall cause a vehicle to enter a box junction so that the vehicle has to stop within the box junction due to the presence of stationary vehicles. Accordingly, even though it may cause no obstruction or inconvenience, a vehicle should not enter a box junction at all unless and until there is already clear space on the other side to drive into. As TfL considered that a contravention had occurred, a postal penalty charge notice (PCN) was issued to the Appellant.
The Appellant did not dispute the fact that their vehicle had stopped within the junction as alleged, but raised a number of points in their representations, principally that (i) alleged defective wording in the PCN rendered it a nullity and thus unenforceable and (ii) the blocking of the exit by stationary vehicles beyond it did not amount to a contravention under the relevant legislation. They referred to similar issues in their appeal details.
In relation to the first of these issues, the Appellant asserted that wording used in the PCN was unlawful and that it did not comply with the relevant legislation. They supported their assertion by citing a number of previous PATAS decisions (including my own) in which appeals were allowed. I have read the cases to which the Appellant has referred and, although these may be persuasive, they are not binding on me.
The Appellant has referred to an anomaly in the legislation that provides for two distinct periods in which the recipient may either pay the penalty charge (i.e. 14 or 28 days from the date of the PCN) or make representations against the PCN (i.e. 28 days from the date of service of the PCN). They state that, on page 1 of the PCN, the two periods are conflated, resulting in confusion and prejudice, at least, and culminating in illegal confluence. However, the legislation is specific in that it requires an enforcement authority to refer to those periods in a PCN.
For completeness, I set out below the relevant statutory provisions and the relevant parts of the PCN:
(A)Section 4(8) of the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003 as amended ("the 2003 Act") states,
"A penalty charge notice under this section must-
(a) state-
(i) the grounds on which the council or, as the case may be, Transport for London believe that the penalty charge is payable with respect to the vehicle;
(ii) the amount of the penalty charge which is payable;
(iii) that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice;
(iv) that if the penalty charge is paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the notice, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by the specified proportion;
(v) that, if the penalty charge is not paid before the end of the 28 day period, an increased charge may be payable,
(B)Paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the 2003 Act states,
"The enforcing authority may disregard any such representations which are received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the penalty charge notice in question was served."
(C)The front page of TfL's PCN reads,
"A penalty charge of £130.00 is payable before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of this notice. If the penalty charge is paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of this notice, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by 50%. If you fail to pay the penalty charge or make representations before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice, a charge certificate may be issued to you increasing the penalty charge payable to £195-00 ...(my highlighting)"
(D)The final page of the PCN has a box headed, "How to make representations (written challenge against the penalty charge)", and reads, so far as is relevant,
"..... Your representation must be received before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which this notice is served otherwise it may be disregarded.
However, if you wish to take advantage of the discount amount, you must ensure that your representation is received in the 14 day period beginning with the date of this notice...."
The Appellant's objection to the PCN wording is that the highlighted words above contradict the previous statement and wrongly infer that the owner has 28 days from the date of service of the notice to pay the penalty charge whereas, in fact, the statute allows only 28 days from the date of the notice itself. They consider that the conflation of the two periods creates ambiguity and confusion, and could even be interpreted that a charge certificate may be served even if representations have been made. It is submitted that the PCN is therefore defective and should be cancelled.
TfL submits that each expression in the PCN is fully accurate and leaves the motorist in no doubt as to the time period in which he must pay the PCN, or take advantage of the mitigated penalty, or make representations.
I am unclear why the legislative framework should provide for a different length of time to pay the penalty, full or mitigated (i.e. 14 or 28 days from the date of the PCN) from the period allowed to make representations (i.e. 28 days from the date of service of the PCN). However, it does do so, and the 2003 Act requires the enforcement authority to make that clear in their PCN. The highlighted paragraph in the PCN could certainly be better drafted.
As the Appellant has pointed out, the fact that they may not have been prejudiced is not a "cure" to the substantive defect which renders the penalty unenforceable. The decision in R (Barnet) v The Parking Adjudicator (2006) EWHC 2357 (Admin) make clear the importance of complying with the requirements of the legislation. Mr Justice Jackson said in that case "Prejudice is irrelevant and does not have to be established. The 1991 Act created a scheme for the civil enforcement of parking control. Under this scheme motorists become liable to pay financial penalties if certain specified statutory conditions are met. If the statutory conditions are not met then the financial liability does not arise."
In my view there is a serious possibility of real prejudice here. The enforcement cannot be permitted in these circumstances and, accordingly, this appeal must be allowed and no other issue need be determined.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2100628598
Bryan Henry Siequien
Transport for London
03 Nov 2010 07:37:00
Chelsea Em / Royal Hospital Rd
10 Feb 2011
Paul Wright
Appeal allowed
The appeal is allowed, as the Penalty Charge Notice is defective and unenforceable:
The 'date of service' provision contained in paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the London Local Authorities Act 2003 ('LLAA 2003') does not apply to the 14-day and 28-day payment periods specified by section 4(8)(iii) and (iv) of the LLAA 2003, as it only applies to the local authority having a discretion to disregard representations received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the Penalty Charge Notice in question was served (as is clear from a reading of paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the 2003 Act). By stating "If you fail to pay the Penalty Charge Notice or make representations before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice, a charge certificate may be issued to you increasing the penalty charge payable to £180" the Penalty Charge Notice conflates the "28 day period" for payment which begins with the date of the notice in section 4(8)(iii) with the "28 days" for the making of representations which in fact only begin with the date of service of the notice in paragraph 1(3) of the 2003 Act.
In passing, TFL has also failed to produce any evidence in support of the assertion made in its Notice of Rejection letter of 3/12/2010 that "I am able to confirm that this box junction has been authorised for use by Department for Transport and is therefore a legally compliant box junction". This would be another reason for allowing the appeal, the contravention therefore not being proved.
The question of costs does not, however, arise here, as I do not find, on balance, that either party was frivolous, vexatious or wholly unreasonable in pursuing the appeal on this occasion.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2100549287
Mark Sutton
Transport for London
05 Sep 2010 14:47:00
Great Eastern Street/Curtain Rd
10 Dec 2010
Paul Wright
Appeal allowed
Whilst I am satisfied from the CCTV evidence that the appellant's vehicle entered the box junction without knowing whether it would be able to exit the other side completely clearly and that it stopped in the box junction due to the presence of stationary vehicles, the appeal is nevertheless allowed as the Penalty Charge Notice is defective and unenforceable:
The 'date of service' provision contained in paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the London Local Authorities Act 2003 ('LLAA 2003') does not apply to the 14-day and 28-day payment periods specified by section 4(8)(iii) and (iv) of the LLAA 2003, as it only applies to the local authority having a discretion to disregard representations received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the Penalty Charge Notice in question was served (as is clear from a reading of paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the 2003 Act). By stating "If you fail to pay the Penalty Charge Notice or make representations before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice, a charge certificate may be issued to you increasing the penalty charge payable to £180" the Penalty Charge Notice conflates the "28 day period" for payment which begins with the date of the notice in section 4(8)(iii) with the "28 days" for the making of representations which in fact only begin with the date of service of the notice in paragraph 1(3) of the 2003 Act.
The question of costs does not, however, arise here, as I do not find, on balance, that either party was frivolous, vexatious or wholly unreasonable in pursuing the appeal on this occasion.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2100498211
Naser Dabiri
Transport for London
28 Jul 2010 23:50:00
Bowes Rd / Brownlow Rd
14 Dec 2010
Paul Wright
Appeal allowed
Whilst I am satisfied from the CCTV evidence that the appellant's vehicle entered the box junction without being able to exit the other side completely clearly and that it stopped in the box junction (long enough for a Penalty Charge Notice to be issued) due to the presence of stationary vehicles, the appeal is nevertheless allowed, as the Penalty Charge Notice is defective and unenforceable: whilst the Penalty Charge Notice correctly states that the 14-day and 28-day payment periods begin with the date of the notice in accordance with section 4(8)(iii) and (iv) of the London Local Authorities & Transport for London Act 2003, the Penalty Charge Notice then goes on to incorrectly state "If you fail to pay the Penalty Charge Notice or make representations before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice..." when the 'date of service' provision does not apply to the 14-day and 28-day payment periods (see above) - it only applies to the local authority having a discretion to disregard representations received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the Penalty Charge Notice in question was served (in accordance with paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the 2003 Act).
The question of costs against TFL does not, however, arise here, as I do not find, on balance, that TFL was frivolous, vexatious or wholly unreasonable in pursuing the appeal on this occasion.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
211032734A
Benjamin Hochhouser
Transport for London
31 May 2011 14:40:00
Archway Rd/Jacksons Ln
21 Jul 2011
Michael Nathan
Appeal allowed
The contravention alleged is entering and stopping in a box junction when prohibited at 14:40 on 31 May 2011. A Penalty Charge Notice was issued by post after camera enforcement.
I carefully considered the Enforcement Authority's CCTV camera footage, and am satisfied that this shows that the Appellant's car had entered the box junction at a time when its exit on the other side was not clear, and that it had remained stationary wholly within the junction for a minimum of ten seconds. The vehicle is seen to enter the box junction and comes to a halt. I observed that, at the time of such entry, there was already another vehicle moving within the box which then stopped outside it. I am satisfied from the CCTV evidence that the appellant's vehicle entered the box junction without knowing whether it would be able to exit the other side completely clearly and that it stopped in the box junction due to the presence of stationary vehicles.
The Appellant has raised a number of technical and legal issues in relation to the validity of the box junction itself and also the Penalty Charge Notice. With regard to the latter, the Appellant claims that the Penalty Charge Notice is defective and unenforceable, and has referred to PATAS Case Numbers 2100628598 and 2100498211 to which I have had regard.
I agree with the view expressed by the Adjudicators in those cases and propose to allow the appeal on that issue alone, without consideration of the other matters raised by the Appellant concerning the enforceability of the box junction itself.
The point at issue here is that the 'date of service' provision contained in paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to the London Local Authorities Act 2003 ('LLAA 2003') does not apply to the 14-day and 28-day payment periods specified by section 4(8)(iii) and (iv) of LLAA 2003, as it only applies to the Enforcement Authority having a discretion to disregard representations received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the Penalty Charge Notice in question was served. This is clear from paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to LLAA 2003.
By stating "If you fail to pay the penalty charge notice or make representations before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice, a charge certificate may be issued to you increasing the penalty charge payable to £195" the Penalty Charge Notice conflates the "28 day period" for payment which begins with the date of the penalty charge notice, as provided for in section 4(8)(iii), with the "28 days" for the making of representations which in fact only begins with the date of service of the penalty charge notice in paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 1 to LLAA 2003.
I find that the Penalty Charge Notice in this case is defective and unenforceable, and therefore allow the appeal.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2100599897
Anthony Jenkins
London Borough of Waltham Forest
25 Aug 2010 15:18:00
St James Street/Leucha Rd E17
11 Feb 2011
Edward Houghton
Appeal allowed
The Appellant's case is that the PCN issued by the Council does not comply with the requirements of the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003 in that nowhere on it does it state the time limit for the making of representations contained in Schedule 1 Para 1(3) i.e
" The enforcing authority may disregard any such representations which are received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the penalty charge notice in question was served"
S4(8)(a)(viii) of the Act requires a PCN to state ( inter alia)
" that the person on whom the notice is served may be entitled to make representations under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to this Act".
It seems to me that this must necessarily include an explanation of what is contained in Schedule 1; it cannot have been Parliament's intention that the motorist search out the Act and look it up. The time limit is a vital piece of information. It does not appear on the PCN issued to the Appellant. I agree with Appellant that its absence renders the PCN defective and that no payment may be demanded on the basis of it.
The Appeal therefore falls to be allowed. However the Appellant has drawn my attention to a more serious matter. The Council's evidence served in response to the Appeal includes as required a "copy" of the PCN. However when one compares the PCN supplied by the Council with that actually issued to the Appellant it can be seen that on the Council's version the time limit does appear and that what has been supplied is not a true copy. The failure to supply such a copy is of course rendered even more serious by the fact that the point of variance is precisely the issue in the case.
Whether this is deliberate or arises as a result of negligence of some kind, clearly some explanation is required and the matter will be referred to the Chief Adjudicator. So far as the present proceedings go, the Appellant would on the face of it appear to have grounds for applying for costs if he has incurred any.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2220938868
Yehia El-Samman
Transport for London
02 Nov 2022 19:02:00
HANGER LANE / EALING VILLAGE
07 Feb 2023
Belinda Pearce
Appeal allowed
There is no dispute as to the whereabouts of the said vehicle at the relevant time on the material date; the Enforcement Authority assert and the Appellant accepts that the said vehicle entered and stopped on a location subject to an operative restriction denoted by yellow cross-hatching, such demarcation indicating a prohibition against a vehicle remaining stationary within the defined area due to the presence of stationary vehicles.
The Appellant contends that the penalty demanded by the Enforcement Authority exceeds the relevant amount.
The law is that the Appellant is liable for the full Penalty Charge as the entitlement to pay at the reduced rate ends 14 days after service of the Penalty Charge Notice, unless the Enforcement Authority exercises its discretion to subsequently accept the discounted penalty amount.
The Enforcement Authority did exercise discretion at the Notice of Rejection stage by extending a discretionary discount period, stating that the reduced amount be 'paid within 14 days to qualify for this discounted sum.'
That statement is not qualified to indicate from when the 14 day period began, only that the payment be made 'within' such period.
The Enforcement Authority does qualify the commencement of the payment period regarding the full penalty amount by stating 'pay the penalty charge or submit an appeal within 28 days of the date of service of this notice of rejection.'
I find it reasonable that the recipient interpret the discounted payment period to commence likewise with the date of service of the notice of rejection.
Service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.
The Appellant maintains that the Notice of Rejection was received, and service therefore effected, on 19th December 2022, from which date the 14 day period ran.
The Enforcement Authority confirm that 'on 21 December 2022, TfL received a payment of £80.00 in respect of' the Penalty Charge Notice.
I find £80.00 to be the relevant amount; the Enforcement Authority's acceptance of such amount as part-payment and request for an amount due of £80 causes the penalty to exceed the relevant amount. The Appellant has discharged his liability to pay the relevant amount.
Accordingly this Appeal is Allowed.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
211055831A
Sainsburys Supemarkets
Transport for London
05 Sep 2011 11:52:00
Archway Rd / Jacksons Ln
20 Dec 2011
Anthony Chan
Appeal allowed
The Appellant Company was represented by Mr Janssen.
Mr Janssen had initially taken the point that the movement of the vehicle did not amount to a contravention. He has rightly conceded the point and relies on al alleged mis-wording in the PCN.
The sentence which Mr Janssen challenges is under the section headed "Do not ignore this notice". This section provides information to recipients of a PCN what they need to do. The first two sentence concerns payment and the early payment discount. Mr Janssen does not take issue with these. The problem is in the third sentence. I shall reproduce it here for easy reference. It reads:
"If you fail to pay the penalty charge or make representations before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice, a charge certificate may be issued to you…."
This sentence is only partially correct. The 28 day period of payment commences with the date of the PCN but service of charge certificate is not triggered by non-payment alone. It is triggered by the absence of representations within a 28 day period starting from the date of service of the PCN. The correct way to express how a charge certificate may therefore be: "If you fail to pay the penalty charge and do not make representations before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice, a charge certificate may be issued to you…". The use of the word "or" incorrectly suggests that a charge certificate may be issued unless payment is made within a 28 day period commencing with the date of service of the notice, which is different to the date of the notice.
One might argue that such a difference would make no difference especially as the correct payment is already stated in the first sentence, but I think that there is a potential to mislead. The PCN is therefore invalid. I am allowing the appeal.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2220550912
Lucy Daniels
London Borough of Merton
10 Jun 2022 17:26:00
Haydons Rd j/w Cromwell Rd
23 Sep 2022
Michael Burke
Appeal allowed
The allegation on the face of the PCN in this case is entering and stopping in a box junction when prohibited. The prohibition is more formally stated in terms that:
‘a person must not cause a vehicle to enter the box junction so that the vehicle has to stop within the box junction due to the presence of stationary vehicles’.
The above prohibition does not apply where the driver enters the box junction for the purpose of turning right and stops the vehicle only for
‘so long as it is prevented from completing the right turn by an oncoming vehicle or other vehicle which is stationary whilst waiting to complete a right turn’.
Miss Daniels does not dispute that she entered and stopped in the box junction but she claims the above exemption.
The enforcement camera footage shows a straightforward example of the contravention. Had Miss Daniels entered the box junction for the purpose of turning right she could readily have done so. Instead she stopped behind another stationary vehicle. This vehicle was also not waiting to complete a right hand turn. I am satisfied that both Miss Daniels and the driver ahead of her entered the box junction for the purpose of proceeding straight ahead. The exemption cannot apply.
Having considered all the evidence I am satisfied that the contravention occurred and that the PCN was properly issued and served. I am not satisfied that any exemption applies.
Miss Daniels could have had no reasonable complaint had she been required to pay the penalty charge. However, she asserts that the Notice of Rejection misstates the period for payment of the penalty charge.
A Notice of Rejection must warn the recipient that a Charge Certificate may be issued unless payment is received or an appeal made to the Tribunal ‘before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of the notice of rejection’. The Notice of Rejection in the present case sets the period as ‘within 28 days of the date shown on this letter.’ This is a material misstatement of the period and the error cannot be rectified by the Enforcement Authority allowing further time in practice. On this basis I allow the appeal by virtue of collateral challenge.
Case ref
Appellant
Authority
Date & time
Location
Decision Date
Adjudicator
Decision
2220655455
Bysshe Wallace
LB of Waltham Forest
17 Jul 2022 14:12:00
Forest Road / Russell Road
27 Oct 2022
Henry Michael Greenslade
Appeal allowed
This decision has been amended under Regulation 15 of the Road Traffic (Parking Adjudicators) (London) Regulations 1993.
At this scheduled personal hearing the Appellant was represented in person by Mr Morgan and her husband, Mr Emamally, also attended.
The Enforcement Authority did not attend and were not represented.
Under Paragraph 11(1) in Part 7 of Schedule 9 to the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 a box junction marking conveys the prohibition that a person must not cause a vehicle to enter the box junction so that the vehicle has to stop within the box marking due to the presence of a stationary vehicle.
The Penalty Charge Notice was issued under Section 4(1) of the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003 ('the 2003 Act') on the basis of information provided by a camera or other device. There appears to be no dispute that the vehicle was at this location, as shown in the closed-circuit television (cctv) images produced by the Enforcement Authority.
The Appellant’s case is that she was trying to steer clear of a scooter rider who was cruising around on the main carriageway and weaving in and out of the traffic. The Appellant submits that she was deeply concerned and anxious that there could be an accident and thinking it would minimise the chance of that, she pulled up behind the car which was already stationary at the lights.
The closed circuit television (cctv) images show that the Appellant’s vehicle did enter this box junction marking when the vehicle ahead was still in it and then had to stop within the box due to the presence of a stationary vehicle. The images do also show a scooter but it is some way behind the Appellant’s vehicle even after it had stopped in the box.
It does remain the responsibility of the motorist to check carefully at all times whilst driving their vehicle, so as to ensure that they do so only as permitted. The contravention can occur if any part of the vehicle’s wheels are stopped within the box marking. No actual obstruction need be caused for the contravention to occur.
Rule 174 of the current edition of the Official Highway Code refers to box junctions. It explains that these have criss-cross yellow lines painted on the road and warns: ‘You MUST NOT enter the box until your exit road or lane is clear. However, you may enter the box and wait when you want to turn right, and are only stopped from doing so by oncoming traffic, or by other vehicles waiting to turn right. At signalled roundabouts you MUST NOT enter the box unless you can cross over it completely without stopping.’
A box junction is the yellow criss-cross marking prescribed by Diagram 1043 at item 25 in Part 6 of Schedule 9 to the 2016 Regulations. The images produced show that in this case the marking does appear to comply. I am satisfied that it is clear to the motorist that this is a box junction.
Mr Morgan also submits that the Enforcement Authority failed to address properly the original representations to the Enforcement Authority and that the wording of the Penalty Charge Notice is non-compliant.
As to the latter, Section 4(8) of the 2003 Act provides that:
A penalty charge notice under this section must-
(a) state-
(i) the grounds on which the council or, as the case may be, Transport for London believe that the penalty charge is payable with respect to the vehicle;
(ii) the amount of the penalty charge which is payable;
(iii) that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice;
(iv) that if the penalty charge is paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the notice, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by the specified proportion;
(v) that, if the penalty charge is not paid before the end of the 28 day period, an increased charge may be payable;
(vi) the amount of the increased charge;
(vii) the address to which payment of the penalty charge must be sent; and
(viii) that the person on whom the notice is served may be entitled to make representations under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to this Act; and
(b) specify the form in which any such representations are to be made.
Paragraph 3 of the Schedule to Act provides:
Where any representations are made under paragraph 1 above but the enforcing authority do not accept that a ground has been established, the notice served under sub-paragraph (7) of the said paragraph 1 (in this Schedule referred to as "the notice of rejection") must-
(a) state that a charge certificate may be served under paragraph 5 below unless before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of the notice of rejection-
(i) the penalty charge is paid; or
(ii) the person on whom the notice is served appeals to a traffic adjudicator against the penalty charge; and
(b) describe in general terms the form and manner in which such an appeal must be made,
and may contain such other information as the enforcing authority consider appropriate.
Regulation 4(2)(a) of the Road Traffic (Parking Adjudicators) (London) Regulations 1993 provides that the local authority shall produce a copy of the relevant Penalty Charge Notice.
Page 3 of the Penalty Charge Notice states:
"If you fail to pay the Penalty Charge or make representations before the end of a period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice an increased charge of £195 may be payable. We may send you a Charge Certificate seeking payment of this increased amount. At this stage it would be to [sic] late to make representations".
There is a clear, and incorrect, confluence of the two provisions. The wording on the Penalty Charge Notice produced to me does not comply with the legal requirements.
It might be said that the Appellant is not prejudiced as, in effect, the time limit for initial payment of the penalty charge is increased
However, the Appellant’s representative has referred to the decision in R (Barnet) v The Parking Adjudicator (2006) EWHC 2357 (Admin).
Although that case involved a Penalty Charge Notice issued under different statutory provisions, it makes clear that the fact that an appellant may not have been prejudiced is not a "cure" to the substantive defect. The defect renders the penalty unenforceable. make clear the importance of complying with the requirements of the legislation. Mr Justice Jackson said in that case "Prejudice is irrelevant and does not have to be established. The 1991 Act created a scheme for the civil enforcement of parking control. Under this scheme motorists become liable to pay financial penalties if certain specified statutory conditions are met. If the statutory conditions are not met then the financial liability does not arise."
I cannot find that there is any serious possibility of real prejudice here but the wording is not correct and, accordingly, for the reasons set out this appeal must be allowed.
It follows that no other issue need be determined.